Unbounded folly

I have been reading a book by an American academic, John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War [5^th edition, 1990]. He wrote it, he says, because he became increasingly convinced that the usual explanations [or excuses] for wars – nationalism, militarism, alliance systems, economic factors – were all bloodless abstractions which left out of account the human element: the personalities who unleash wars. “Who are these people that are dragging us to the abyss? What can we do to stop them? If we cannot stop them, can we limit the damage they are able to inflict?” Because war is not, as is commonly asserted, an ineradicable part of human nature, but a sickness that can be cured.

Each chapter is a case study of a 20^th century war: World War I, Hitler’s attack on Russia, the Korean and Vietnam wars, the wars between India and Pakistan, the Israeli-Arab wars, and the Iraq-Iran war. Each of these wars started because of misconceptions, misunderstandings, and miscalculations by those who had the power to unleash or restrain the conflict. Unlike the 19^th century, when the post-Napoleonic European wars had mostly been won by the aggressors, none of these 20^th century wars were won by their initiators, who experienced defeat or, at best, stalemate. This, however, was a lesson which has still not been learned in the new wars of the 21^st century.

What is glaringly obvious from these pages is the incredible degree of ignorance about adversaries, and the blithe conviction of ultimate victory, which impelled so many disastrous decisions. In the case of the Korean war, the Americans were completely disinformed about the real nature and strength of Communist China, and clung to their illusions that the longstanding friendship which they believed had existed between the American and Chinese peoples would prevent hostilities between the two countries. This ignored the basically paternalistic and patronising nature of American ‘friendship’ for Asian peoples, who have never been the willing recipients of American economic and cultural imperialism. The hubris of the iconic General MacArthur in driving on to the Chinese border at the Yalu River stemmed from his total ignorance of Chinese intentions and their real strength, and ended disastrously for the Americans.

Likewise, America’s deepening entanglement in the unwinnable quagmire of Vietnam was the outcome of the complete unawareness of successive American presidents of the real nature of the enemy, and of the terrain in which they had to fight. There was also a stubborn belief that Communism – that obsessive American bugaboo of the 1950s and beyond – was still, after Stalin’s death, a monolithic world conspiracy masterminded from Moscow rather than – as was in fact the case – an increasingly disparate localised phenomenon. Consequently, all conflicts in which America became engaged were wrongly perceived as limbs of the Cold War which America was nobly fighting on behalf of the ‘free world’. But the actual facts, says the author, were strikingly different from Truman’s, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ perceptions. Lyndon Johnson, “totally ignorant of Asia in general and of Vietnam in particular”, precipitated disaster by upping the ante and pouring more troops and air power into an already unwinnable scenario – just as G.W. Bush is doing today in Iraq. And – also like Bush – Johnson, confronted by the power of the weak, was ultimately at a loss what to do except to escalate when he should have cut his losses. As Nietzsche said, “If you look too deeply into the abyss, the abyss will look into you”.

In his concluding chapter, Dr Stoessinger draws these conclusions:

No nation that began a major war in the 20^th century emerged a winner.

In our time, unless the vanquished is destroyed completely, a victor’s peace is seldom lasting.

The personalities of leaders are crucially important in the outbreak of wars.

The most important single precipitating factor in the outbreak of war is misperception. Such distortion may manifest itself in four different ways: in a leader’s image of himself; a leader’s view of his adversary’s character; a leader’s view of his adversary’s intentions towards himself; and finally, a leader’s view of his adversary’s capabilities and power.

There is a remarkable consistency in the self-images of most national leaders on the brink of war. Each confidently expects victory after a brief and triumphant campaign. Doubt about the outcome is the voice of the enemy and therefore inconceivable.

The common belief in a short, decisive war is usually the overflow from a reservoir of self-delusions held by the leadership about both itself and the nation.

A leader’s misperception of his adversary’s power is perhaps the quintessential cause of war.

Wise words which we would do well to heed as the Washington hawks drum up support for yet another Middle Eastern adventure while they still have an unfinished mess there on their hands.